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People care not only about how much they are paid, but also about
what they do. The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between
an individual’s personal motivation and the structure of dynamic incentive
schemes. The optimal long-term contract involves not only transfers at
each date which are contingent on the whole past history of outcomes
but also an initially assigned mission. A modiﬁed martingale property is
shown to hold in equilibrium. Moreover, the occupational choice problem
is investigated and an optimal job separation rule is derived.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economists have traditionally modeled the employment relationship using a
principal - agent framework. An implicit, but crucial, assumption of this set-
ting is the underlying idea that the agent has no willingness to exert eﬀort in
the absence of an explicit, upward sloping, incentive contract oﬀered by the
principal.
Nevertheless, in general, people care not only about how much they are paid,
but also about what they do. In other words, people value the characteristics of
their task in addition to how much they are paid for their work. In particular,
sociologists have identiﬁed two sources of intrinsic motivators: task involve-
ment and goal identiﬁcation. The former denotes the degree to which an agent
derives utility from the actual performance of a task. The latter emphasizes
that agents have objectives for accomplishments that are independent of any
ﬁnancial reward.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between an individual’s
personal motivation and the structure of dynamic incentive schemes. I use a
dynamic (two-period) moral hazard model with one-sided lack of commitment to
investigvate the eﬀect of motivation on the optimal transfer scheme. It has been
shown (Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985)) that the optimal long-term contract
exhibits memory. Does this result continue to hold when agents are motivated?
2More generally, is it always optimal for the principal to retain the agent in the
second period with probability one, once he has discovered his preferred mission
(task)?
A labor contract involves both contingent (on the whole past history of
outcomes) transfers and an initially assigned mission. They are signed under
incomplete and symmetric information. With time (and experimentation), the
agent discovers what he likes to do (his preferred task). Hence, whenever his
current job is very diﬀerent from his favorite one, it may be optimal to have a
job separation. Clearly, the optimal contract originally oﬀered by the principal
should take into account this possibility, merely that the agent can walk away
when he does not like his job.
Some of the paper’s ideas can be illustrated by an example.
To aid the exposition, we shall imagine a supervisor (principal) - PhD student
(agent) relationship.
At the onset of a PhD program, very few students know exactly the precise
contours of the ﬁeld in which they would like to conduct research in.
However, many factors, such as what the student has done previously in
his undergraduate program, the trend of the job market, suggestions (or con-
straints) from a third party, determine the subject of the student’s ﬁrst paper.
Facilitated by elective coursework, seminar partecipation and research assis-
tantship, the student learns his true type, that is to say, his favorite research
area.
This area can be either closely related to the topic of his ﬁrst paper or distant.
3In the latter case, the student, especially when his initial research output has
been successful, will face a trade-oﬀ between continuing the ongoing relationship
with the current supervisor (and collecting the rewards implied by the memory
property of the optimal long-term contract) or following his discovered bent
(and starting from scratch a totally diﬀerent dissertation under the supervision
of a brand-new professor).
W ew i l ls e et h a ti tm a yb eo p t i m a lt oc h a n g eﬁeld when the distance between
the true type and the initial one is large enough. Suppose that the student’s
original focus was in applied industrial organization. Then, by chance, he found
out to enjoy much more informational economics. One conclusion of the analysis
is that a changeover is, in this case, optimal. The supervisor, at the beginning
of the relationship, fully and rationally anticipates the future events. For this
reasons, he is not going to invest heavily on the student early in the relationship.
Rather, rewards are smoothed intertemporally, and thus concentrated in future
periods.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss
some related literature. Section three describes the basic problem. Section four
studies optimal contracts. Section ﬁve both lays out some testable implications
and suggests possible extensions left for future research. Section six concludes.
The computation of the optimal long-term contract is contained in the appendix.
42 Related Literature
The closest paper in the literature is Besley and Ghatak (2003). They study
incentives in a context of motivated agents, that is agents who pursue goals
because they perceive intrinsic beneﬁts from doing so. This paper uses the same
baseline model but allows for dynamics. This is not an innocuous extension. In
particular, the shape of the optimal long-term incentive scheme becomes more
elaborated and an additional issue naturally arises: the occupational choice
problem.
The ideas developed in the paper can be related to three main strands of
the economic literature: occupational choice, intrinsic motivation and contract
theory.
There is a large literature on occupational choice, started with Jovanovic
(1979) and continued with Harris-Holmstrom (1982), Gibbons-Murphy (1992)
and Felli-Harris (1996) among others. While these models concentrate their fo-
cus on the wage dynamics and the optimal quitting policy, I prefer to investigate
in more detail the contractual aspect. From one side, the contract space I am
dealing with is larger and so the related set of predictions richer. From the other
side, the bandit nature of the problem faced by the agent is much simpler.
Intrinsic motivation stands for the idea that individuals undertake some
actions for their own sake. Thus, individuals perform acts for the pleasure
they experience in doing them: monetary incentives can be either crowded out
or complemented by intrinsic motivation. Kreps (1997) draws the attention
to economists’ research agenda on the importance of the interaction between
5norms and economic incentives. Because intrinsic returns are non-contractible,
Murdock (2002) shows the optimality of implicit contracts. Nevertheless, his
paper focuses on the implications of goal identiﬁcation rather than task involve-
ment, as this paper does. Moreover, in his world, contracts are always, and
necessarily, incomplete: the court of law is totally superﬂuous. Benabou and
Tirole (2003) use a static informed principal framework to identify conditions
under which monetary rewards are harmful, instead of beneﬁcial. Their focus is
on the motivation crowding-out eﬀect.1 My paper neglects this peculiarity and
money has never a detrimental impact on the agent’s payoﬀ, neither directly
nor indirectly.
Chiappori et al. (1994) oﬀer an interesting survey of the literature on re-
peated moral hazard. Rochet and Stole (2002) provide a complete analysis
of a static model with random partecipation constraints and a continuum of
types, while Laﬀont and Tirole (1990) study a type-dependent partecipation
constraint. Ma (1991) analyses a similar contractual problem. However, there
are at least two diﬀerences between his paper and this one. Firstly, here agents
are motivated, and thus there is an occupational choice problem. Secondly, in
my model, the consequences of the provision of eﬀo r td y eo u ta tt h ee n do ft h e
period, while in Ma’s model, they have a long-run impact on the principal’s
production process. Hence, in his world, the information is not only incomplete
but also asymmetric and renegotiation-proof contracts have to be used.
1Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) provide an empirical investigation about the hidden costs
of monetary rewards.
63M o d e l
3.1 Players
There are two players. One (risk-neutral) principal (P) and one (risk-averse)
agent (A). P can credibly commit to a long-term contract, while A cannot
commit.
I am not modeling how the P is able to commit to this contract. One
possibility is a supergame equilibrium, where the deviation is severely punished
by the one-shot (Nash) equilibrium (trigger strategy)2. Another possibility is the
existence of external enforcement mechanism. The agent’s inability to commit
hinges on the inalianability of human capital.
3.2 Preferences and Production Technology
3.2.1 P
P has a separable (over time) von Neumann-Morgestern utility function:
VP = S(q1) − t1 + δp(q1)(S(q2) − t2)
where S (qi) stands for the value the P assigns to qi units of the good,
with S’ > 0 and S” < 0. qi (respectively ti) is the output (transfer) at date
t= i, i ∈ {1,2}.p ( q i) is the probability (A sticks to the terms of the original
contract|q1). δ(≥ 0) is the discount factor, that I allow to be greater than one
2Levin (2003) can be used to model it explicitely.
7in cases where period 2 lasts much longer (it is more important) than period
one.
One remark is noteworthy: P’s utility function is standard except for p(q1).
According to the initial assumption (about commitment), the A can walk away
from the current relationship at the onset of period 2, after he has learnt his
true type. It may be too costly (and thus not proﬁtable) for the P (especially
for realization of θ very distant from θˆ) to retain the A with probability 1.
Therefore, second-period proﬁts are not only taken in expectation over q1 and
q2, but also weighted by the probability that the A doesn’t breach the original
contract.
3.2.2 A
The A has intertemporal von Neumann-Morgestern utility given by:
UA = u(t1) − g(e1)+δ [p(q1)(u(t2) − g(e2) − k | θ − θˆ |)+( 1− p(q1))U2(q1)]
where ei represents A’s eﬀort exerted at date i, with ei ∈ {0,1},f o ri ∈ {1,2}.
g(ei)i sA ’ sd i s u t i l i t yo fe ﬀort i, with normalization as follows: g(1)≡ ψ and g
(0) ≡ 0. u(ti) is the utility derived from transfer at date i, with u’ > 0 and u” <
0 (risk-aversion). k is the relative importance of motivational aspects (intrinsic
motivators) with respect to monetary rewards (extrinsic motivators).
θˆ stands for the task assigned (once and for all) by the P to the A. Instead,








δ(≥ 0) is the A’s discount factor, for simplicity assumed equal to the P’s one.
Finally, U2(q1) is the A’s second-period outside option and, with full generality,
can be contingent to the ﬁrst-period output realization.
The A’s preferences speciﬁcation features the term −k | θ − θˆ |.T h e A
not only cares of money and eﬀort, but also of the quality of the job in which
he is employed. The larger the diﬀerence in taste (between the current work
and his preferred one), the higher should be the monetary reward in order to
compensate him for this additional source of disutility.
This additive term features only in the second period, because, by assump-
tion (see timing of contracting), in the ﬁrst period the Nature has not revealed
yet this piece of information to the A. Moreover, given the irreversability of
time, what I have done in the past, today can be considered as sunk. Another
interpretation can be: only when I know what I enjoy, I can feel satisﬁed in
doing it.
I assume throughout the paper that the P has the full ability to restrict the
A’s access to the capital market: the A is neither allow to save nor to borrow,
hence all transfers are immediately consumed.
3.2.3 Production Technology
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q | effort =0
´
≡ π0,w i t h
9π1 − π0 denoted by ∆π.
Stochastic returns are independently distributed over time, so that the past
history of realizations does not yield any information on the current likelihood
of a success or a failure of the production process.
A su s u a l l ya s s u m e di nh i d d e na c t i o nf r a m e w o r k ,e ﬀort is neither observable
nor veriﬁable: it is a non-contractible variable.
3.3 Timing of Contracting
The timing of the game is as follows.









2) A accepts or refuses the contract.
3) If A has accepted it (always the case in equilibrium), he decides whether
exerting eﬀort or not. Subsequently, ﬁrst-period output q1 and transfer t1 take
place.
4) At the onset of the second period. A discovers his preferred task θ (type).
He can then decide to stick to the terms of the original contract or reneging it
and getting the market outside option U2(q1).
5) If the agent have not walked away, he decides whether exerting second-
period eﬀort or not. And, ﬁnally, second-period output q2 and transfer t2 take
place.
The timing of contracting is summarizesd in the following ﬁgure 1.
104A n a l y s i s
I ﬁrst solve for the optimal contract, then I study the implications of motivation
on occupational choice.
4.1 Optimal long-run contract
In solving the model, I focus on the case where eﬀort is extremely valuable for
the P, who always wants to implement a high level of eﬀort in both periods.
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IR1 is the A’s intertemporal partecipation constraint: the A is at least as
well oﬀ by signing the long-term contract than by rejecting it.
IC1 is the A’s ﬁrst-period incentive compatibility constraint: anticipating his
future stream of random payoﬀs (conditional on exerting eﬀort in the second
period), it is optimal for the A to exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst period.
IC2(q1) is the A’s second-period incentive compatibility constraint: no mat-
ter what the history of past performance has been (that is, the realization of
















A’s optimal strategy is to stick to the terms of the original contract.3
3| θ − θˆ | is a measure of the distance between the A’s preferred mission and his current
12An implicit assumption is both that A is equally productiove for P in every
task he is assigned to and P is such a large ﬁrm that he can give to A every
mission in the support of the distribution of θ.
From now on, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that θ ∼ U[θ
−,¯ θ],
symmetrically around 0 (that is, θ










The main feature of the long-term optimal contract are summarized in the
next proposition.
Proposition 1 With a twice repeated moral hazard problem, the optimal long-












´ ∀q1 ∈ {q, ¯ q}
is satisﬁed. Moreover, the ﬁrst-period optimal task assignment is E(θ)=0a n d
all constraints, in equilibrium, are binding.
PROOF: in appendix.
The following corollary analyses extreme cases: either when there is no
second-period random IR constraint (in other words:
∂p(q1)
∂u2(q1) =0 )o rw h e n
the contract is memoryless (that is, ∂u1
∂u2(q1) =0 ).
task.
13Corollary 2 When k → 0 and U2(¯ q)=U2(q
−
)=0 , the standard martingale
property
h0(u1(q1)) = Eq2 [h0(u2(q1))]
is satisﬁed at the optimum. While, when k →∞ ,r e n e g a t i o nh a p p e n sw i t h
probability one.
The intuition of the above proposition is quite straighforward. The expected
marginal cost of giving up some rewards to the agent in period 1 following any
output q1 must be equal to the "corrected" expected marginal cost of giving up
these rewards in the corresponding continuation of the contract, where corrected
means that the principal should take into account the impact of the second-
period rewards on the incentive to walk away faced by the agent.
The optimal long-term contract will be characterized by more high-powered
incentives in the second-period (because they not only are useful in inducing
eﬀort, but also increase the probability of retaining the agent).
4.2 Occupational choice
The problem studied above is intrinsically dynamic, thus one question naturally
arises: if the A discovers that his present task is not very agreeable, then he
may be better oﬀ reneging the original contract signed at date 0 and changing
occupation. In particular, the A will face a trade-oﬀ between continuing the
ongoing relationship with the current employer (and collecting the rewards im-
plied by the memory property of the optimal long-term contract) or following
14his preferred mission (and starting from scratch under a new employer).
Deﬁne S ≡ π1S(¯ q)+( 1− π1)S(q
−
).
I assume for the rest of the paper that
π1h
µ









































.T h a ti s ,t h ePﬁnds optimal in the second period to retain the A with
a high probability but not with certainty4.
Given the previous assumption and proposition 1, it is possible to show that
∂u1
∂u1(q2) > 0, that is the contract exhibits covariance (u1,u 2(q1)) > 0.
Note that U2(q1) is not a function of θ (type of the job). This is a very
stark assumption. Among other things, it implies that A can switch to every
occupation he wants to and the wage (in the new profession) may depend on
A’s track of performance but not on the quality of the task he is assigned to.




):e i t h e r
the market does not have record-keeping ability or the realization of q1 is P’s
private information.
Proposition 3 Whenever U2(q
−
)=U2(¯ q), there are values of θ such that:
1) If | θ
∗ |≥ θ1, then walking away is optimal for the A, independently of
4This assumption implies also pC’ > p’V (because h’ > 0): excessive transfers in the second
period with respect to the ﬁrst-best, where pC’ = p’V.
15the realization of the output in period 1;
2) If | θ
∗ |∈ (θ2,θ 1), then it is optimal for the A to continue the ongoing
relationship when q1 =
−
q and to walk away in the complementary case; and
3) If | θ
∗ |≤ θ2,t h e ni fi so p t i m a lf o rt h eAt ok e e ph i sw o r da n dd on o t
renege the initial contract
PROOF:
Figure 2 illustrates the idea stated by the above proposition.
Recall that, by assumption, U2(q1) is independent on the realization of θ,














− ψ − k | θ |
∂u1
∂u1(q2) > 0 implies that, given a certain realization of θ, y(¯ q) >y (q
−
).
It is immediate to see that y(q1) reaches a unique global maximum at θ =0 .
And the claim follows.¥
Because of the A’s risk-aversion, the P spreads intertemporally the A’s re-
wards and punishments to minimize the cost of implementign a high-eﬀort in
period 15. This implies that u2(¯ q) >u 2(q
−
). Hence, given a constant market
outside option, the likelihood of retaining the A in the current job is higher
under a high output realization.





5Thus, the burden of the incentive constraint is smoothed between today and tomorrow.
6Many situations can arise (some of which are both (either) unrealistic and (or) uninter-
16Proposition 4 If U2(
−
q) is much larger than U2(q
−
), then there are values for θ
such that:
1) If | θ
∗ |≥ θ3, then walking away is optimal for the A, independently of
the realization of the output in period 1;
2) If | θ
∗ |∈ (θ4,θ 3), then it is optimal for the A to continue the ongoing
relationship when q1 = q
−
and to walk away in the complementary case; and
3) If | θ
∗ |≤ θ4, then it is optimal for the A to keep his word and do not
renege the initial contract
PROOF:
Figure 3 is very similar to ﬁgure 2, except that now U2(¯ q) >U 2(q
−
).A n d
this implies that there are cases where the result of proposition 3 is reversed: it
is more likely to retain ﬁrst-period unsuccessful As.¥
The above idea can be illustrated by an example. Suppose there is a pro-
fessor of economic theory that has published a revolutionary article in ﬁnancial
economics. Subsequently, Wall Street banks try to allure him with a high salary
and perks package. These incentives crowd out the university, because the pro-
fessor is likely to quit his current job, unless the mission of the academy closely
coincides with the one of the scholar. However, when the professor’s research
is unsuccessful, a large distance between the assigned mission and the preferred
one can be sustained, because his outside option is low (nobody wants to hire
him).
esting): a complete analysis is available upon request.
175A p p l i c a t i o n s
Firstly, I suggest possible extensions of the basic model presented in section four
and, then, I point out some testable implications.
5.1 Extensions
The model can be easily extended in various directions.
Instead of a two-period model, it is possible to study a stationary problem:
that is, an inﬁnitely repeated relationship. In this latter framework, and given
the same timing of the game7, my (tentative) guess is that it is almost surely
optimal for the A to change job, unless his type coincides with E(θ).
Another possible extension can allow for a competitive market of Ps: the
number of Ps in the economy goes to inﬁnity. The demand of the ﬁnal prod-
uct qi is the key determinant of the equilibrium quantity (because supply is
inﬁnitely elastic). Rochet and Stole (2002) have looked at this interesting case
of competition among Ps.
Finally, one further extension consists in endogenizing the outside option
U2(q1). Suppose that the market is so large that the agent can choose (in
period one) to do exactly what he likes. The problem becomes a one-period
moral hazard, with eﬀort still extremely important. Maybe that it is not an
eﬃcient solution to have the agent to leave his original principal with probability
one. In fact, for θ close enough to θˆ, the original long-term contract provides
a (valuable to the agent and, hence, to the principal) form of insurance.
7The crucial part is about the A knowing his true type early in the relationship.
185.2 Predictions
It is possible to identify four main empirical implications stemming from the
previous analysis.
• There exists a lower bound to wages, determined by the characteristics of




). Thus, given the commitment tech-
nology, the wage is downward rigid (see, for instance, Harris and Holm-
strom, 1982).
• Small ﬁrms have to pay on average higher wages. Assume that at date
one, once the agent has discovered his type, the employer has some job
openings. Larger ﬁrms have ceteris paribus more vacancies available and
therefore can economize on monetary incentives: the insurance premium
they have to pay to the agent is lower.
• The identity of the employer matters only through the kind of task that
is oﬀered to the agent. Hence, when we observe a change of employer (job
separation) that is not accompanied by a change of mission, a variation in
the wage scheme should have taken place.
• The endogenized outside option is a crucial variable in understanding and
pinning down the characteristics (either successful or unsuccessful) of peo-
ple that leave their current job. The investigation about the formation of
the outside option can shed light on possible diﬀerences between markets.
196C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper makes one primary contribution: it investigates the shape of the
optimal long-term incentive scheme when agents are intrinsically motivated.
In particular, a modiﬁed martingale property is shown to hold in equilibrium.
Moreover, the occupational choice problem is investigated and an optimal job
separation rule is derived.
At the end, in section ﬁve, some issues, both theoretical and empirical, left
for future research have been laid down.
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218A P P E N D I X
Deﬁne (in order to simplify notation):
u(t2(q1, ¯ q)) ≡ u2(q1)
u(t2(q1,q)) ≡ u2(q1)
u(t1(¯ q)) ≡ ¯ u1
u(t1(q)) ≡ u1
h(.) ≡ u−1(.) (Grossman-Hart (1983) kind of trick)
From θ
∗(q1) equation, it is immediate to show:

      



































Eq2 [S(q2) − h(u2(q1)) | e2 =1 ]
22s.to
π1¯ u2(q1)+( 1− π1)u2(q1) − ψ ≥ u2(q1) ∀q1 ∈ {q,q}




Both constraints are binding at the optimum. To see it formally, write
down the Lagrangian and use Kuhn-Tucker conditions, that in this case are












Note: this problem looks exactly the same as a (standard) static moral
hazard problem.¥
4 equations in 4 unknowns: given u2(q1),
©




Lemma 6 The ﬁrst-period optimal task assignment will be E(θ).





−Eθ(| θ − θˆ |)8
8Recall, argmaxx constant·f(x) = argmaxx f(x) whenever constant > 0. In this case, in









Using Leibniz’ rule: θˆ=
θ+θ
2
Note, the FOC is necessary and suﬃcient.¥
Proposition 7 With a twice repeated moral hazard problem, the optimal long-
















V2(u2(q1)) ≡ S − C(u2(q1)) (P’s continuation value of the contract)
C(u2(q1)) ≡ π1h(¯ u2(q1)) + (1 − π1)h(u2(q1)) (cost of implementing a high
eﬀort in period 2 following the promise of a second-period utility u2(q1))




because of symmetric support around 0, this is the same as −kθ
2 ,as o r to f
insurance premium9.
IR1, the constant is equal to p(¯ q)π1 +p(q)(1−π1) and, in IC1, ∆π(p(¯ q)−p(q)) (both strictly
positive).
9The premium represents a ﬁxed cost for the P and this creates a discontinuity in the
24The ﬁrst-period P program can be written as follows:
max
¯ u1,u1,u2(¯ q),u2(q)












u1 + δp(q)(u2(q) − kθ
2 − U2)
i
≥ ψ − δU2 (µ)
¯ u1 + δp(¯ q)(u2 (q) − kθ
2 − U2) −
³










































FOC (w.r.t. ¯ u1and u1):
−π1h0(¯ u1)+µπ1 + λ =0 ( 1 )
−(1 − π1)h0(u1)+µ(1 − π1) − λ =0 ( 2 )
µ = π1h0(¯ u1)+( 1− π1)h0(u1)
λ = π1(1 − π1)(h0(u1) − h0(u1))
program (when p(q1) goes from 0 to ε, P has to provide a large upfront payment). Hence,
even if h(u) takes simple functional form (say, quadratic or exponential), the optimal transfer
scheme can not be computed in a closed form expression (unless k takes extreme values).





























Combining (1) and (3)
h0(¯ u1)=
p(¯ q)C0(u2(¯ q)) −
∂p(¯ q)





u2(¯ q) − kθ
2 − U2
´













Corollary 8 The agent’s intertemporal partecipation constraint is binding.
PROOF (By contradiction) Suppose it is not. Then, the principal can reduce
¯ u1 and u1 b yt h es a m ep o s i t i v ea m o u n tε.P i c kε small enough, such that IR1
is still not binding. IC1 is not aﬀected by this change in ﬁrst-period transfers.
But the principal is now strictly better oﬀ.
Also note, µ = π1h0(¯ u1)+( 1− π1)h0(u1) > 0.¥
26Corollary 9 The agent’s ﬁrst-period incentive constraint is binding.














(thus IR1 holds with equality) and con-
tinuation utilities same as before. For ε suﬃciently small, IC1 is still slack. Re-
call h”>0 (by concavity of u). The new transfer scheme has the same Eq1[u(q1)]
but a smaller variance: Va r q1(u0
1(q1)) <Va r q1(u1(q1)).
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the P’s objective function, it is easy to show
that P is now better oﬀ using C’ (contradiction).¥
Thus, ¯ u1 >u 1.
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TIMING OF CONTRACTING 
 





P offers a long-term  A accepts or refuses   A exerts effort     First-period output q1      θ is learned by A  A accepts the contract or  A exerts effort        Second-period out- 
contract {t1(q1),t2(q1,q2), θ^}  the contract          and transfer t1 take place      refuses it, getting U2(q1)          put q2 and transfer 
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Figure 3 
U2(q1), y(q1)